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Business leaders, government officials, and academics are focusing considerable attention  on the concept
of "corporate social responsibility" (CSR), particularly in the realm of environmental protection.  Beyond
complete compliance with environmental regulations, do firms have additional moral or social responsibilities
to commit resources to environmental protection?  How should we think about the notion of firms
sacrificing profits in the social interest?  May they do so within the scope of their fiduciary responsibilities
to their shareholders?  Can they do so on a sustainable basis, or will the forces of a competitive marketplace
render such efforts and their impacts transient at best? Do firms, in fact, frequently or at least sometimes
behave this way, reducing their earnings by voluntarily engaging in environmental stewardship?  And
finally, should firms carry out such profit-sacrificing activities (i.e.,  is this an efficient use of social
resources)?  We address these questions through the lens of economics, including insights from legal
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Business leaders, government officials, and academics are focusing more and more attention 
on the concept of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR).  The central issue is the appropriate role 
of business.  Everyone agrees that firms should obey the law. But beyond the law -- beyond full 
compliance with environmental regulations -- do firms have additional moral or social 
responsibilities to (voluntarily) commit resources to environmental protection?  
 
One of the challenges of examining the concept of CSR is simply identifying a consistent and 
sensible definition from among a bewildering range of concepts and definitions that have been 
proposed in the literature.
1 We adopt a simple definition originally offered by Elhauge (2005):  
sacrificing profits in the social interest.  This definition has the merit of being consistent with some 
of the most useful prior perspectives (Graff Ziven and Small 2005; Portney 2005; Reinhardt 2005), 
while focusing the discussion on the most interesting normative and positive questions.   
Of course, questions regarding sacrificing profits in the social interest apply beyond the 
environmental sphere.  The academic debate over the legality of sacrificing profits in the public 
                                                 
*Reinhardt is the John D. Black Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; Stavins is the Albert 
Pratt Professor of Business and Government at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
University Fellow of Resources for the Future, and Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research; 
and Vietor is the Senator John Heinz Professor of Environmental Management at Harvard Business School.   
Exceptionally valuable research assistance was provided by Matthew Ranson, and our research benefited greatly from 
conversations with William Alford, Max Bazerman, Robert Clark, Joshua Margolis, and Mark Roe.  The authors are 
grateful to Suzanne Leonard, Charlie Kolstad, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on a previous version of 
the manuscript, but all remaining errors are our own. 
1See reviews by Wood and Jones (1996) and Mohr, Webb, and Harris (2001).  
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interest appears to have begun in 1932 with opposing articles (Dodd 1932, Berle 1932) in a Harvard 
Law Review symposium on “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?”  The debate in 
economics began more recently, with Milton Friedman’s 1970 article, “The Social Responsibility of 
Business Is to Increase Its Profits,” in the New York Times Magazine.  Since then, the debate has 
continued, and CSR has received considerable attention from both scholars and the public, especially 
in the environmental protection area.
 
The purpose of this article, which is part of a three-article symposium on Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Environment,
2 is to introduce and provide an overview of the major issues 
related to CSR,  synthesize what is known about CSR in the environmental arena, and thereby 
identify where the greatest uncertainties remain.  To this end, we address four key questions about 
the issue of firms sacrificing profits in the social interest.
3  May they do so within the scope of their 
fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders?  Can they do so on a sustainable basis, or will the 
forces of a competitive marketplace render such efforts and their impacts transient at best?  Do 
firms, in fact, frequently or at least sometimes behave this way, reducing their earnings by 
voluntarily engaging in environmental stewardship?  And finally, should firms carry out such profit-
sacrificing activities?  In other words, is this an efficient use of social resources?
 
This article is organized as follows.  We begin by examining legal thinking about whether 
firms may sacrifice profits to benefit individuals other than their shareholders, and then look at the 
legality of CSR in the United States and other countries.  Next, we draw on theories of industrial 
organization and management to identify circumstances under which firms can sacrifice profits 
without being punished by market forces.  We then turn to positive questions about whether firms 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
2 The other two articles in the symposium, by Lyon and Maxwell (2008) and Portney (2008), discuss CSR from the 
theoretical and empirical perspectives, respectively. 
3These four questions were originally identified by Hay, Stavins, and Vietor (2005).  
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actually do engage in CSR. Here we review and synthesize empirical evidence to assess whether 
some firms truly exceed full compliance with the law, and if so, whether their “socially responsible” 
actions actually sacrifice profits.  To address our fourth question, should firms -- from a societal 
perspective -- be carrying out such activities, we examine CSR in a normative light and consider 
economic arguments on both sides of the issue. The final section summarizes our findings and offers 
some conclusions. 
2.  May Firms Sacrifice Profits in the Social Interest? 
The prevailing view among most economists and business scholars is that corporate directors 
have a fiduciary duty to maximize profits for shareholders.  While this view underlies many 
economic models of firm behavior, its legal basis is actually not very strong.  The judicial record, 
although supportive of a duty to maximize profits for shareholders, also leaves room for the 
possibility that firms may sacrifice profits in the public interest.  The courts’ deference towards the 
judgment of businesspeople -- the “business judgment rule” -- prevents many public-minded 
managerial actions from being legally challenged. 
2.1  The Legal Purpose of the Corporation 
The most widely accepted position on the legal purpose of the corporation – known as 
shareholder primacy (Springer 1999; Fisch 2006; Ehrlich 2005) -- was articulated by Milton 
Friedman in 1970: 
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of 
the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That 
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic  
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rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom (Friedman 1970). 
A more subtle version of the shareholder primacy argument is the “nexus of contracts” 
approach (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Easterbrook and Fischel 1991), which  views the corporation 
as a nexus of legal contracts between the suppliers of various factors of production, who agree to 
cooperate in order to generate monetary returns.  These agreements specify that in exchange for their 
contributions, the owners of most factors of production -- labor, land, intellectual property rights, 
etc. -- will receive set payments with little risk.  Shareholders -- the suppliers of capital -- accept the 
residual financial risk of doing business, and in return receive the residual profits.  Since 
shareholders have no contractual guarantee of a fixed payment from the firm’s activities, any profits 
that are diverted towards other activities, such as pursuit of “the social good,” come directly out of 
their pockets (Butler and McChesney 1999).  Thus, from this perspective, CSR is close to theft. 
A second view of the role of the corporation is found in the team-production model (Blair 
and Stout 1999), which views the corporation as the solution to the moral hazard problem that arises 
when the owners of factors of production must make firm-specific investments but fear they will not 
be rewarded ex post.  To solve this problem, the board of directors of the corporation functions as a 
neutral “mediating hierarch” that allocates residual profits to all of the factors of production (team 
members) according to their relative contributions.
4  Under the team-production model, sacrificing 
profits in the social interest is legal, as long as the profits are allocated to a deserving factor of 
production. 
A third view of the purpose of the corporation is the “operational discretion” model, which 
holds that the law grants corporate managers discretion to comply with social and moral norms, even 
                                                 
4 For example, many U.S. states have enacted statutes that permit corporate directors to consider the interests of 
stakeholders other than shareholders.    
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if doing so reduces shareholder profits (Elhauge 2005).  The judiciary’s unwillingness to second-
guess matters of business judgment has the practical effect of shielding managers who choose to 
sacrifice profits in the public interest. 
A fourth and final position is the “progressive view” that the corporation is organized for the 
benefit of society at large, or at the very least, corporate directors have fiduciary responsibilities that 
extend to a wide variety of stakeholders (Sheehy 2005; Gabaldon 2006).  Under this view, 
sacrificing profits in the public interest is entirely legal.  The progressive view, however, is not well-
rooted in either statutes or case law (Clark 1986). 
2.2  The Legality of CSR in the United States 
In the United States, a variety of legal requirements define the responsibilities of the 
corporation (and its board of directors) to shareholders and other stakeholders.  However, as 
discussed below, these requirements are limited in practice. 
2.2.1  Corporate Responsibilities to Shareholders and Other Stakeholders 
Although corporations in the United States are granted the “legal fiction of separate 
corporate personality,” a corporation’s decisions are made by its board of directors, or by executives 
who have been delegated decision-making authority (Clark 1986).  To ensure that directors and 
managers do not act negligently or subvert corporate resources for their own benefit, the legal 
system imposes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act “in good faith and in the best interests of the 
corporation” (Scalise 2005), and places limitations on the motives, purposes, and goals that can 
legitimately influence directors’ decisions (Cox and Hazen 2003). The duty of care complements the 
duty of loyalty by requiring managers to “exercise that degree of skill, diligence, and care that a 
reasonably prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances” (Clark 1986, p.123).  Violation 
of fiduciary duties can result in personal liability for directors (Scalise 2005). Legal formulations of  
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fiduciary duties typically refer to the “best interests of the corporation”, but whether the 
corporation’s “best interests” include only its shareholders or a wider set of constituents is not 
immediately clear (Cox and Hazen 2003).  The prevailing opinion is that fiduciary duties are owed 
to shareholders (Blomquist 2006), but a minority supports the view that corporations can be 
managed in part for the benefit of other stakeholders (Lee 2005). 
Every U.S. state recognizes the right of businesses to make charitable contributions.  Seven 
states allow charitable donations regardless of corporate benefit, and nineteen other states allow 
donations that benefit the business or advance the public welfare (Choper, Coffee, and Gilson 2004). 
Statutes in the remaining 24 states (including Delaware) include similar language, but without legal 
clarification about whether donations are permitted when they do not benefit the firm (Donohue 
2005).
5  
State corporate statutes grant corporations legal powers similar to those of people, and allow 
corporations to participate in lawful activities (Clark 1986).  As a result, corporations presumably 
have the power (but not necessarily the right) to undertake CSR activities (Donohue 2005).  
Corporations can write their own corporate charters to explicitly authorize themselves to participate 
in CSR.  For example, the New York Times is incorporated to pursue objectives other than profit 
maximization (Donohue 2005). 
These statutory requirements and judicial precedents place limits on the actions of 
corporations and their boards.  But an important judicial construct -- the business judgment rule -- 
creates substantial deference to firms’ managerial decisions. 
                                                 
5In addition, 29 states have statutes that allow managers to consider the interests of non-shareholders such as employees, 
customers, suppliers, creditors, and society at large (Springer 1999).  
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2.2.2  The Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule “acts as a presumption in favor of corporate managers’ actions” 
(Branson 2002). It requires courts to defer to the judgment of corporate managers, as long as their 
decisions satisfy certain basic requirements related to negligence and conflict of interest.  The basic 
premise is that since corporate managers are far more skilled at making business judgments than 
courts, allowing courts to second-guess managers’ decisions would create potentially large 
transactions costs (Elhauge 2005). 
The business judgment rule makes fiduciary duties difficult to enforce, and it effectively 
grants managers discretion to “temper business decision making with their perceptions of social 
values” (Clark 1986; Fisch 2006; Scalise 2005; Blair and Stout 1999).
6  As a practical matter, as 
long as managers can plausibly claim that their actions are in the long run interests of the firm, it is 
almost impossible for shareholders to challenge the actions of managers who act in the public 
interest. 
                                                 
6 For example, Clark cites the 1968 case of Shlensky v. Wrigley, in which the Illinois Court of Appeals allowed William 
Wrigley, Jr., the president and majority shareholder of the Chicago Cubs, to refuse to install lights at Wrigley Field 
because of his belief that night games would be bad for the surrounding neighborhood (1986). 
The business judgment rule also offers managers protection from accusations of conflict of 
interest, primarily because it does not recognize most non-financial incentives as conflicts (Elhauge 
2005; Branson 2002).  Corporate managers’ decisions can be regarded as irrational -- and thus not 
protected by the business judgment rule -- only if they “go so far beyond the bounds of reasonable 
business judgment that their only explanation is bad faith” (Blomquist 2006, p.699).  Donohue 
(2005) cites the extreme example of a Delaware court that ruled that the business judgment rule 
protected the 1989 decision by Occidental Petroleum to spend $120 million, slightly less than half of  
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the company’s yearly net profit, on an art museum named after its 91 year old CEO, Armand 
Hammer.   
So, are firms in the United States prohibited from sacrificing profits in the public interest?  
And if so, is the prohibition enforceable?  The answers to these two questions appear to be “maybe” 
and “no,” respectively. “While case law falls short of unequivocally mandating shareholder wealth 
maximization, it also falls short of unambiguously authorizing the pursuit of non-shareholder 
interests other than instrumentally for the benefit of the shareholders” (Lee 2006, p. 557).  And as 
long as managers claim some plausible connection to future profitability, the business judgment rule 
grants them substantial leeway to commit corporate resources to projects that benefit the public. 
2.3  The Legality of CSR in Other Countries 
With their cultural traditions of social democracy or firm loyalty to employees, most 
European countries and Japan have legal systems that differ from the system in the United States.  
The legal systems in these other countries place a greater emphasis on stakeholder participation, and 
sometimes codify this by legalizing various forms of profit-sacrificing behavior.  Europeans have 
sought to incorporate CSR into their investment climate, both at the institutional and individual level 
(Sutton 2004), and in strong social democracies, such as Germany and France, stakeholders 
(particularly employees) have much stronger legal positions than in the U.S. (Roe 2000).   
Corporations in Europe and Asia are also more likely to have a few large shareholders, who may 
take social responsibilities seriously, particularly those towards employees (Roe 2000). This 
contrasts with the pattern of highly dispersed share ownership in the United States.   
2.3.1 Industrialized  Countries 
Common law industrialized countries, primarily former British possessions, share many legal 
features with the United States.  Corporations in these countries have similar board structures, face 
similar legal requirements, and even share some legal precedents.  In such countries, CSR is  
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discouraged, but permitted.  Under Australian corporate law, for example, corporate managers are 
required to make decisions in the best interest of the corporation, while a statutory business 
judgment rule grants managers considerable discretion (Corfield 1998).  Likewise, Canadian law 
requires that directors and officers of corporations act in the best interests of the corporation, but the 
director is not permitted to ignore the collective interests of shareholders (Borok 2003).  The United 
Kingdom’s legal system permits corporate managers to engage in socially beneficial activities, as 
long as there is a plausible rationale that the activities are in shareholders’ interests (Lynch-Fannon 
2007).  
In contrast with common law jurisdictions, countries with civil law systems tend to place a 
greater emphasis on stakeholder participation in corporate governance.  Corporate boards often 
include employee representatives, and cultural traditions emphasize loyalty to employees.  In these 
countries, more forms of CSR are permissible. In France, corporate directors have both a duty of 
care and a duty of loyalty (Fanto 1998).  Although there has been a shift towards more investor 
friendly laws, the French legal code explicitly allows directors to make decisions based on the 
interests of all constituencies. German law does not even give management an explicit obligation to 
maximize shareholder value (Marinov and Heiman, 1998), and large German corporations have a 
two-tiered board structure that encourages the board to consider the interests of parties other than 
shareholders (Corfield 1998).  
Japanese corporate law is similar to corporate law in the United States, in that directors have 
duties of care and loyalty, which, if violated, can be grounds for shareholder lawsuit.  But Japanese 
corporations have a strong tradition of CSR oriented towards their employees.  In years with high 
profits, large corporations usually retain their earnings and reinvest them for the benefit of 
employees (Miwa 1999).  The shares of many firms are owned by banks who handle firms’ credit or 
by important business partners (Corfield 1998).  These shareholder-creditors have financial goals  
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that are similar to those of long-term employees, particularly in terms of corporate stability and 
minimizing risk (Roe 2000). 
2.3.2  Developing Countries and Multinational Enterprises 
Corporate law in developing countries has a number of special characteristics.  First, the 
corporate legal system is often new.  As a result, businesses have little experience complying with 
the law, and there are fewer judicial precedents mapping out the law’s boundaries.  Second, legal 
institutions in developing countries are often weak.  Regulations can go unenforced; agency 
problems can be a serious issue; and members of the judiciary may be corrupt.  Third, the operations 
of multinational corporations in these countries can lead to conflicts between the interests of home 
and host states. 
Thus, both the laws governing CSR and the degree to which those laws are enforced may 
vary substantially across developing countries.  Assuming that the laws in most developing countries 
allow some scope for managerial activity that may sacrifice profits, the question remains whether 
firms can do so in view of competitive pressures in the markets for their outputs and inputs.  It is to 
this question that we now turn. 
3.  Can Firms Sacrifice Profits in the Social Interest? 
Simply because the legal system may allow firms to sacrifice profits in the social interest 
does not mean that firms can do so on a sustainable basis in the face of competitive pressures.  
Under what conditions is it economically feasible for firms to sacrifice profits in the social interest?  
Before turning to this question, we address a somewhat broader question:  under what conditions 
might it be sustainable for firms to produce goods and services, such as public goods, that benefit 
individuals other than their customers (Lyon and Maxwell 2004; Vogel 2006)?  
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We identify six conditions that would facilitate the production of such goods and services. 
All six of these conditions involve government intervention, imperfect competition, or both.  First  is 
the imposition of regulatory constraints that require a firm as well as its competitors to carry out 
some socially beneficial actions.  Second is the possibility that such production is  not costly to the 
firm.  For example, restaurants frequently donate leftover food to homeless shelters. The third 
condition is that the socially beneficial actions may reduce a firm’s business expenses by an amount 
greater than the cost of the actions themselves.  For example, installation of energy-saving (climate 
friendly) technologies may generate long-term cost savings that outweigh upfront costs. Fourth, in 
some cases socially beneficial actions may yield an increase in revenue.  It is easy to think of goods 
and services that are differentiated along environmental lines, such as clothing made of organic 
cotton, or wood from forests managed in accordance with some principles of sustainability.     
Socially beneficial actions could also generate goodwill, improving reputation and sales. Fifth, firms 
may choose to go beyond full compliance with environment, health, or safety laws in order to 
improve their position in current or future regulatory negotiations.  By doing so, they may be able to 
deflect or influence future regulation or deflect enforcement of existing regulation.   Sixth, some 
firms may use over-compliance to spur future regulation, which would provide a competitive 
advantage over less adaptable firms 
We now turn to our more restrictive definition of CSR and address the question raised above: 
under what conditions is it economically feasible for firms to sacrifice profits in the social interest? 
3.1  When Is it Feasible for Firms to Engage in Profit-Sacrificing CSR? 
In some cases firms undertake CSR actions voluntarily, while in others they engage in CSR 
only under pressure from market participants or other social forces.  In practice, it is difficult to 
discern voluntary from “reluctant” CSR.  Whether CSR initiatives are voluntary or reluctant, their  
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economic sustainability depends on the  market pressures and social expectations confronted by the 
firm (Borck, Coglianese, and Nash 2006).  
3.1.1 Voluntary  CSR 
The first possibility -- that stakeholders voluntarily sacrifice profits -- is what some observers 
would think of as the “purest form” of CSR.  The primary economic agents who could fund such 
activities are shareholders and employees. 
Some shareholders may be willing to subsidize firms’ profit sacrificing behavior.  Stock 
issued by socially responsible firms is a composite commodity which combines a financial 
investment product with a charitable giving vehicle (Graff Zivin and Small 2005).  When investors 
purchase the stock, they may be motivated by self-interest or by altruistic motives.  As long as 
investors are willing to fund CSR activities, firms can participate in them.  But whether investors are 
willing to accept lower returns may depend on whether the firm already enjoys an economic position 
that allows it to obtain rents, such as through natural monopolies, niche markets, imperfect 
information, regulatory distortions, anti-takeover laws, and other market imperfections.
5  In this 
case, investors sacrificing profit may still earn returns above the market norm.  
Willingness to accept below market returns may depend on whether investors hold stakes in 
publicly- or privately-held companies.  Investors with large private holdings are more likely to take 
an interest in their companies’ activities and be able to influence the companies’ actions.  Whether 
this additional interest and influence would have a positive or negative influence on CSR is an open 
question. 
                                                 
5 Firms have strong economic incentives to take advantage of any market power available to them.  If a firm maintains 
market power, it can -- in principle -- pass on the costs of CSR to its suppliers and/or customers. For example, regulated 
public utilities, which are granted geographic monopolies on specific conditions such as provision of universal service, 
may decide to engage in CSR activities and use the firm’s monopoly power to pass resulting costs on to consumers.  
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Evidence suggests that some individuals are willing to pay more for socially responsible 
goods (Jensen et al. 2002).  The existence of such “ethical investors” could -- in principle -- have 
consequences for firms that do not participate in CSR activities (Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 2001). 
For example, if ethical investors’ choices increase the cost of capital for “irresponsible” firms, some 
of these firms might be forced to adopt more socially responsible practices.  If the share price 
differential becomes sufficiently large, these firms may decide to participate in CSR activities to 
increase their own stock price (Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 2001; Graff Zivin, and Small 2005).  
But the effect of green investors on the cost of capital may be small.  Because irresponsible firms 
will generate higher returns (relative to their stock price), investors in these firms will accumulate 
capital more quickly than socially responsible investors, and over time may dominate the capital 
market. This would lead to a decrease in the cost of capital for irresponsible businesses (Heinkel, 
Kraus, and Zechner 2001). 
Employees may sacrifice part of the returns to labor to further the social good.  This could 
occur explicitly if employees are given the opportunity to use their own salary and benefits to fund 
CSR projects.  For example, some executives may be able to channel part of their compensation 
towards the cost of CSR activities, or lawyers may be able to donate their time to pro bono work.  
Employees may also fund CSR implicitly, such as when a firm works in a field that employees 
perceive as socially responsible (e.g., providing services to the elderly, remediating oil spills).  
Employees may be willing to accept less than the fair market value of their labor (as determined by 
the wage they would receive for working in a less-socially responsible industry), because they are 
compensated in other ways through the knowledge that their work benefits society at large (Frank 
1996).  
Unfortunately, empirical evidence on CSR and wages is inconclusive.  Most revealed 
preference studies show that wages are lower at non-profit firms than at for-profit firms, but this  
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non-profit wage penalty disappears in econometric analyses that control for worker and firm-specific 
characteristics (Francois 2004).  If non-profit status is a proxy for social responsibility, then socially 
responsible firms may not enjoy a significant discount on labor prices.  This conclusion is supported 
by findings that CEO compensation at firms listed in the Domini Social Index (DS 400) is not 
significantly different from CEO compensation at other firms in similar industries (Frye, Nelling, 
and Webb 2006).  
3.1.2 Reluctant  CSR 
Corporate decisions are actually made by individual managers and directors, not by the 
“firm” per se.  Those decisions often further the interests of profit-minded shareholders, but not 
always.  Investors may have little choice but to accept some degree of CSR profit-sacrificing 
activities. It may be less costly to accept a degree of principal-agent “slack” than to eliminate it 
completely, because managers who are excessively constrained may be ineffectual.  
Investors may also be forced to accept profit-sacrificing activities that are the result of 
external constraints.  This may be particularly relevant in the developing world, where 
environmental regulatory standards lag behind those of industrialized countries.  For example, 
equipment purchased from industrialized countries may incorporate pollution control technology 
that meets standards considerably stricter than those in effect in a developing country (Jaffe, 
Peterson, Portney, and Stavins 1995). 
The magnitude of the profits that managers can sacrifice against investors’ wishes depends 
on the structure of managers’ compensation and the strength of shareholder oversight.   
Principal/agent problems can be costly.  Managers have been observed to “satisfice” profits, that is, 
seek to achieve an adequate rate of return for shareholders and then divert the firms’ resources to 
their personal ends (Choper, Coffee, and Gilson 2004; Clotfelter 1985).  
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3.1.3 Unsustainable  CSR 
Under many conditions, firms that participate in costly CSR activities will have to raise 
prices, reduce wages and other costs, accept smaller profits, or pay smaller dividends -- and accept 
the economic consequences.  For example, a firm’s stock price may decline until it is proportional to 
returns, and attracting new capital may be difficult because returns are below market averages.  
Other short-term economic consequences may include loss of market share, increased insurance 
costs, increased borrowing costs, and loss of reputation.  In the long term, the firm may face 
shareholder litigation, corporate takeover, or closure. Such consequences simply illustrate the 
general proposition and observation that (financially) inefficient firms tend to disappear (Alchian 
1950; Altman 1999). 
This process of economic survival of the fittest suggests that firms that engage in 
unsustainable CSR may find themselves being pushed out of business.  The forces of globalization 
only increase this pressure. Given the seemingly inevitable outcome of this process, why would any 
firm choose to participate in unsustainable CSR activities?  First, principal/agent problems may lead 
managers to make decisions that commit the firm to short-term CSR actions, even if those activities 
will not be continued in the long run.  Second, managers may misjudge the potential profitability of 
certain actions, leading them to invest in actions that benefit society but harm the firm’s bottom line. 
Neither the managers’ probability assessments nor their motivations are transparent to outside 
observers, making it very difficult to distinguish between them (Baron 2006).   
3.2  Economic, Structural, and Organizational Constraints 
A variety of factors influence the economic actors who make decisions about engaging in 
CSR activities.  These factors include managerial incentive and monitoring constraints, and 
organizational structure and culture.   
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Whether or not firms are able and likely to engage in CSR depends on managers’ incentives 
and constraints, which in turn are determined by managers’ preferences, ethical beliefs, contracts, 
and goals.  The most direct incentives managers face are their employment agreements.  For 
managers whose compensation is designed to align their incentives with those of shareholders, 
sacrificing profits means reducing their own compensation.  In the United States, chief executive 
officers (CEOs) are usually paid in a mixture of stocks, stock options, and salary, with their 
compensation linked to explicit measures of the firm’s performance (Prendergast 1999).  But the 
relationship between compensation and firm performance may be close to flat at some levels of firm 
performance, which means CEOs may be able to trade off compensation against CSR activities at a 
rate they judge acceptable. 
  Organizational culture may also be significant (Howard-Grenville, Nash, and Coglianese 
2006).  Organizational identity influences how individuals within the firm view the purpose of the 
firm, what it stands for, and its future goals.  Organizational self-monitoring affects how an 
organization interacts with outside stakeholders.  Firms that are more self-conscious about their 
image may expend greater effort to communicate and interact in “socially appropriate” ways than 
other firms, even if their core values related to socially beneficial behavior are similar. 
Other factors may also affect whether firms can sacrifice profits in the social interest.  For 
example, firm size appears to matter, with evidence that larger firms can sacrifice proportionately 
more profits (Adams and Hardwick 1998).  Further, public visibility may increase pressure on firms 
to participate in CSR activities:  firms in notoriously “dirty” industries may find themselves under 
heavy pressure from public advocacy groups to reduce their emissions or to participate in offsetting 
activities (Brown et al. 2006).  Finally, firms cannot participate in CSR if their work provides no 
scope for it.  CSR activities are simply much more plausible for firms in certain industries (Porter 
and Kramer 2006).    
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4.  Do Firms Sacrifice Profits in the Social Interest? 
As described above, there are specific circumstances in which firms can sacrifice profits in 
the social interest without suffering serious adverse economic consequences.  Whether they actually 
do so is another matter.  This section discusses empirical evidence about the existence of such profit-
sacrificing behavior.  
Before interpreting the evidence, it is important to be aware of several challenges to making 
inferences about CSR.  First, it is difficult to test whether firms’ actions actually go beyond ordinary 
compliance with environmental regulations.  Data on environmental performance are typically very 
limited, and because of the difficulty of observing appropriate counterfactuals, it is difficult to 
demonstrate that firms sacrifice profits.  Whole industries often engage in CSR together, leaving 
behind no comparison group.   Even when firms act individually, it is difficult to know whether 
unobservable characteristics explain differences in both socially responsible activity and 
profitability. Studies that link profitability to CSR practices are particularly vulnerable to this 
problem.  For example, because many high-technology companies have low pollutant emissions (in 
contrast with firms engaged in electricity generation, heavy manufacturing, or resource extraction), 
the  high-tech boom in the 1990s created a perceived but spurious correlation between market 
measures of “socially responsible business practices” and stock returns.  Furthermore, as discussed 
above, there are a variety of ways in which firms can profit from investments in socially beneficial 
projects.  Many actions also have effects on profitability that differ in the short versus the long term, 
with a short-term decrease in profits followed by a more-than-compensatory increase in long-term 
profits.  Thus, demonstrating that an action has truly sacrificed profits in the social interest is 
exceptionally difficult.    
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Of course, distinguishing between motivations and outcomes is even more difficult.   
Although most firms are likely motivated by a combination of social and financial concerns, 
managers may cite social responsibility as the motive for actions that were actually driven by 
profitability.  Or managers may use profitability to justify socially responsible business choices, 
even when those choices result in smaller profits (Baron 2006).   
4.1  Do Firms Over Comply? 
A first step in evaluating whether firms participate in CSR is to determine whether they over 
comply with regulations or participate in other costly activities that benefit society.  We consider 
five sources of evidence:  voluntary government programs, voluntary industry initiatives, voluntary 
action by individual firms, corporate charitable donations, and shareholder resolutions. 
4.1.1  Voluntary Government Programs 
In principle, the willingness of a firm to participate in a voluntary government program could 
be evidence of CSR activity.  A variety of studies have evaluated the determinants of participation in 
voluntary government programs (Borck, Coglianese, and Nash 2006).  Several patterns emerge. 
First, larger firms are more likely to participate in voluntary programs.  Second, participation is more 
likely for firms that either produce final goods or experience more pressure from NGOs and 
consumers.  Third, firms with higher emissions or poor compliance records are more likely to 
participate in voluntary programs.  And fourth, participation may be positively influenced by factors 
such as industry association membership, R&D expenditures, organizational culture, and managerial 
discretion.  However, there is no consensus that voluntary government programs have generated 
environmental benefits net of the opportunity cost of the resources required to implement them.  
4.1.2  Voluntary Industry Initiatives 
In addition to voluntary programs administered by governments, industry associations have 
created voluntary initiatives.  For example, the Responsible Care program, established in 1989 by  
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the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association, requires participating facilities to adopt ten guiding 
principles and six codes of management practices related to the environmental and social dimensions 
of community interactions, facility management, and customer and supplier interactions.  By and 
large, the program was ineffective because it did not provide strong incentives for compliance (King 
and Lenox 2000).  Similarly, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) was created in the 
wake of the 1979 reactor meltdown at Three Mile Island, a nuclear power plant in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania.  A third example is Sustainable Slopes, a voluntary program for reporting and 
encouraging improved environmental performance at ski resorts. The evidence indicates that firms 
took advantage of positive publicity, although the actual environmental benefits are debatable 
(Rivera and de Leon 2004). 
In general, industry-sponsored programs exhibit the same kinds of participation patterns as 
government-administered voluntary programs.  That is, larger firms, more prominent firms, and 
firms with poorer environmental records are more likely to participate.  Again, there is no systematic 
evidence of positive environmental impacts net of social costs. 
4.1.3  Voluntary Action by Individual Firms 
An indicator of firm participation in independently developed CSR activities is whether firms 
adopt CSR plans, environmental management systems, or other plans that seek to encourage 
socially-beneficial decision making within the firm.  These plans often have the nominal goal of 
taking a holistic management approach towards compliance with environmental and safety laws, 
contractual and voluntary environmental obligations, management of environmental and social 
impacts and risk, and other issues (Clark 2005).  These systems may benefit firms by allowing them 
to manage the business aspects of environmental and social issues, but they may also serve as a 
mechanism for firms to improve environmental quality or otherwise benefit society.  
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One such mechanism is ISO 14001, an international standard that provides guidelines for 
monitoring environmental outputs, controlling environmental processes, and improving 
environmental performance (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2006).  To demonstrate that its 
environmental management system complies with the standard, a business (or any other 
organization) must be audited by a third-party auditor.  Capital intensity, intensity of competition, 
and dependence on overseas markets are all positively associated with voluntary compliance with 
the standard (Chapple et al. 2001). 
The best source of evidence about whether firms participate in CSR activities on their own 
initiative is independent studies of socially responsible actions.  Perhaps surprisingly, many studies 
of individual beyond-compliance behavior analyze firms in developing countries (Hartman, Huq, 
and Wheeler 1995; Hettige et al. 1996; Pargal and Wheeler 1996; Blackman and Bannister 1998; 
and Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler 2000).  One possible reason for this focus is that firms in 
industrialized countries are subject to a wide range of environmental regulations that make it 
difficult to judge whether their actions are legally required, risk-averting, or voluntarily beyond 
compliance.  In contrast, in the developing world, pollution regulations may be poorly enforced or 
even nonexistent, making it easier to identify individual  beyond-compliance behavior.   
4.1.4  Corporate Charitable Contributions 
Evidence of corporations making financial contributions to charity supports the general 
hypothesis that corporations can and do commit corporate resources to CSR.  Average contributions 
as a percent of net income before taxes increased, from less than 0.5 percent in the 1930s to 1.1 
percent in the 1960s and 1970s (Harris and Klepper 1976).  In general, CEOs and other high-level 
corporate officers have a high degree of control over the amount and destination of corporate 
charitable contributions, even if their company has established a separate charitable foundation 
(Kahn 1997). But charitable giving can be curtailed by debtholders (Brown et al. 2006; Adams and  
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Hardwick 1998).  Overall, the evidence shows that charitable giving is more likely when financial 
and monitoring constraints are weak.  Corporate charitable giving is also sensitive to firm income 
and marginal tax rates (Clotfelter 1985). 
4.1.5 Shareholder  Resolutions 
Shareholders sometimes request that corporations comply with ethical or other requirements. 
 In 2005, the shareholders of public U.S. corporations proposed 348 resolutions on social and 
environmental issues, of which 177 reached a proxy vote (Social Investment Forum 2006).  On 
average, these resolutions have received support from 10 to 12 percent of all votes cast.  Of the 25 
social policy resolutions in the U.S. that gained the highest percentage of votes during the years 
2003 to 2005, only six gained a majority of all votes cast. But winning even a modest share of votes 
in a shareholder resolution can influence management policies. 
4.2  Is There Evidence of Profit-Sacrificing Behavior? 
According to our strict definition of CSR, beyond-compliance behavior is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for CSR because, under some conditions, such behavior can be profitable.  One 
way to measure the profit sacrificed by socially responsible companies would be to calculate the 
difference in profitability between firms that do and do not participate in socially responsible 
activities.  In fact, a large literature, consisting of at least seventeen review articles, has explored this 
relationship.
8   
The most recent and comprehensive review is by Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2007). In 
a meta-analysis of the results from 167 studies of the relationship between financial performance and 
socially responsible business practices (ignoring the mechanism and direction of causality),  they 
find that 27 percent of the analyses show a positive relationship, 58 percent show a non-significant 
                                                 
8See, for example,  Aupperle, Carroll, and Hatfield 1985; Wood and Jones 1996; Griffin and Mahon 1997; Orlitzky, 
Schmidt, and Rynes 2003.  
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relationship, and 2 percent show a negative relationship.
6  Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh argue that 
the evidence indicates that CSR, in general, has little effect on profitability, but note that there is 
stronger evidence to suggest that some causality does operate in the opposite direction:  companies 
that are profitable are more likely to engage in more CSR activities.   
The finding that there is little relationship between CSR and profitability is consistent with a 
market equilibrium in which firms invest in socially responsible projects until the marginal returns 
decline to the overall market rate of return.  In this situation, investing in CSR is not profitable (in 
the sense that it does not generate economic rents), but neither is it a losing proposition.  Instead it 
means that for most firms, CSR “pays for itself.” 
These conclusions require a number of caveats.  First, when evaluating studies of the 
relationship between social responsibility and stock returns, it is important to keep in mind that not 
all companies that are classified as socially responsible actually sacrifice profits.  Many operate in 
industries, such as software development, that by their very nature have little environmental or social 
impact.  Second, many of the measures of CSR used in such studies are not consistent with CSR as 
we define it in this article.  Thus, measured effects on profitability may have more to do with 
advertising, charitable contributions, or other tangentially relevant factors than with CSR. 
In summary, evidence on sacrificing profits in the social interest is lacking.  The bulk of the 
available evidence suggests that most firms view socially responsible actions in the same way that 
they view more traditional business activities, such as advertising and R&D.  Instead of altruistically 
sacrificing profits, they engage in a more limited -- but more profitable -- set of socially beneficial 
activities that contributes to their financial goals.  Hence, although proponents of sustainable 
business practices may argue that being environmentally responsible will inevitably lead to higher 
profits in the long term, the relationship between socially responsible activities and profitability may 
                                                 
6 Thirteen percent did not report a sample size that could be used to test significance.  
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be best characterized as some firms will generate long-term profits from some socially responsible 
activities some of the time (Reinhardt 2000). 
5.  Should Firms Sacrifice Profits in the Social Interest? 
Even if firms may, can, and do sacrifice profits in the social interest, an important normative 
question remains, namely, should they? In other words, is it really in the broadly defined social 
interest for firms to carry out such activity?  There are two main approaches to answering this 
question.  First, we can compare firms’ actual CSR choices with the CSR alternatives available to 
them.  For any firm, such alternatives include a broad range of projects addressing various private 
and public issues, costing different amounts, and resulting in varying degrees of environmental 
protection and profitability.  For example, a power plant could reduce its emissions of carbon 
dioxide, sulfur dioxide, or particulate matter; switch to a renewable source of fuel; implement a job 
training program to benefit local community members; make a donation to a charitable organization; 
or take any number of other “socially responsible” actions.  The question of interest here is whether 
firms’ actual CSR choices are likely to be optimal relative to available alternatives. 
A second approach takes a public policy perspective, where a comparison is made between 
allowing CSR (i.e., permitting firms to sacrifice profits in the social interest) and prohibiting CSR 
(i.e., requiring firms exclusively to maximize profits for shareholders).  To evaluate these two 
approaches, we employ a variety of criteria, including social welfare and legal, political and social 
considerations.  
5.1  Social Welfare  
In the context of CSR, the social welfare criterion suggests that: (1) firms should invest in 
projects that produce the highest level of social welfare; and (2) it is preferable to allow CSR if 
aggregate welfare is likely to be higher when CSR is allowed than when it is prohibited.  
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The benefits of CSR include direct welfare gains to individuals, such as asthmatics living 
near a power plant that voluntarily reduces its emissions.  More broadly, if firms voluntarily 
internalize externalities, a more efficient allocation of resources may result.  Of course, there is no 
reason, ex ante, to anticipate that firms will reduce externality-producing activities to efficient levels. 
The direct costs of CSR are the loss of consumer surplus resulting from firms producing less 
output at higher cost and hence at higher prices.  In addition, shareholders receive reduced financial 
returns.  On the other hand, some shareholders may gain utility from the knowledge that their profits 
have been invested in socially responsible projects. 
There are a number of reasons to believe that firms do not make socially optimal CSR 
investments, in the sense of choosing activities that generate the greatest net social benefits, subject 
to budgetary constraints.  This is because firms’ CSR decisions are influenced by a number of 
factors that are unrelated to social benefits and costs.   
First, firms’ CSR investment choices are influenced by managers’ personal preferences and 
by firm characteristics.  For example, some managers may favor building art museums, while others 
favor the provision of affordable housing.  This idiosyncratic element of personal preference is 
particularly likely if principal/agent issues drive CSR (Butler and McChesney 1999).  Similarly, 
firms’ choices about CSR activities are affected by the nature of their industry, firm size, technical 
capabilities, and relevant expertise, geographic location, and existing regulatory limits.  To the 
extent that these factors are unrelated to the social benefits and costs of CSR, their influence on firm 
decisions about CSR may result in social inefficiency. 
Second, although firms may be well informed about the private costs of CSR, they may have 
little experience evaluating its social benefits, leading them to choose inefficient levels of 
environmental protection effort.  Third, firms may fail to consider alternative mechanisms to achieve  
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their social goals.  For example, firms may be able to achieve higher social returns by donating 
profits to charities, which are dedicated exclusively to the task of improving social welfare and thus 
presumably are well-suited to the task.  If this is the case, then firms that fund CSR activities 
effectively “crowd out” their own donations to more efficient charities (Graff Zivin and Small 2005). 
Finally, choice of CSR activity is affected by the firm’s ability to sacrifice profits.  Firms that are the 
most profitable are also the most able to sacrifice profits in the public interest. However, the 
opportunity cost of sacrificing profits may also be greatest for these firms, assuming they could 
otherwise invest the resources in their businesses and earn similarly high returns. 
Although there are reasons to doubt the optimality of firms’ decisions about CSR, there are 
also reasons to believe that firms’ CSR investment decisions may increase welfare.  First, firms have 
access to private information about their current and future pollution activities, including control 
costs. Such information can lead firms to identify better policies than less well-informed government 
agencies.  Second, firms have relevant expertise and operational capacity.  Third, government 
policies are driven by a variety of objectives, only one of which may be maximizing social welfare.  
Hence, compared with the counterfactual of prohibiting CSR but leaving government policy 
otherwise unchanged, allowing CSR may generate higher net social benefits.  
Many types of potential CSR activities --  from reducing particulate emissions to preserving 
open space -- are mandated to some degree by federal, state, or local laws and regulations.  To the 
extent that such regulations require a level of environmental protection that is below the socially 
optimal level, additional corporate investment in these activities can increase social welfare (if 
incremental social benefits exceed incremental social costs).  In addition, there may be socially 
responsible activities that address environmental issues that are unregulated but of significant 
scientific or political concern (e.g., global climate change).  In such cases (i.e., in the absence of 
government policies), CSR activities may lead to positive net social benefits.  However, given that it  
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appears to be relatively rare for firms to actually sacrifice profits in the social interest, the overall net 
welfare flow from CSR, whether positive or negative, is unlikely to be large. 
5.2  Legal, Political, and Social Considerations 
Although legality is not synonymous with social desirability (as evidenced by the legality of 
many socially undesirable activities), some observers would surely identify legality as a normative 
criterion by which to judge many actions.  In the second section, we argued that in the United States 
and other common law countries, sacrificing profits in the social interest is not strictly legal, 
although in practice CSR is not prohibited because of the business judgment rule and problems of 
enforcement. 
One argument that can be made against CSR is that it is not a democratic process.  There is 
no particular reason to believe that society should prefer firms’ choices and priorities over the 
choices and priorities of a democratic government.  Some observers might also argue that 
corporations already dominate too many aspects of modern life, and that it would be undesirable for 
them to control the supply of public goods as well. 
Under a broader interpretation of the idea of social responsibility, however, it can be argued 
that businesses have a moral commitment to hold themselves to higher ethical standards and to 
engage in activities that benefit society. In fact, in a poll of citizens’ attitudes towards the 
responsibility of businesses in 23 developed and developing countries, public opinion seems to 
support the notion that corporations in the West should “set higher ethical standards and help build a 
better society.” In countries such as China and Kazakhstan, however, the notion that corporations 
should “make profits, pay taxes, create jobs, and obey all laws” dominates (Environics International 
Ltd. 1999).    
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5.3  The Special Case of Developing Countries 
Given that economic, social, and environmental conditions in developing countries are so 
different from those in industrialized countries, one would expect the answers to normative 
questions about CSR to also be different.  For example, environmental regulations in the developing 
world are often not well-enforced.  Hence, many relatively cost-effective interventions that have 
already been implemented in industrialized countries may still be available to businesses that operate 
in the developing world.  This suggests that CSR could lead to significant gains in net social welfare. 
Other concerns about CSR arise in the developing country context. Precisely because legal 
and contractual systems often operate poorly in developing countries, it is important to prevent 
activities that could erode the basis for future economic growth.  Thus, strong investor protections 
may be particularly desirable in developing economies (Marinov and Heiman 1998) to help buttress 
the political viability of privatization and market-based systems.  Allowing managers to divert 
profits to socially responsible projects means giving managers substantial discretion.  However, 
there is also the risk that this discretion could tempt managers to use corporate resources for personal 
gain. 
 6.  Summary and Conclusions 
This article has examined the concept of firms sacrificing profits in the social interest  in the 
environmental realm. This section summarizes our answers to the four questions posed at the outset: 
May they do so within the scope of their fiduciary responsibilities to their shareholders?  Can they 
do so on a sustainable basis?  Do firms behave this way?  And, finally, should firms carry out such 
profit-sacrificing activities?   
Our starting point for examining the first question -- may they -- was the prevailing view 
among economists and business scholars that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to maximize  
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profits for shareholders.  Surprisingly, the legal basis for this view is not very strong.  Although the 
judicial record is supportive of a duty to maximize profits for shareholders, it leaves room for firms 
to sacrifice profits in the public interest.  The deference that courts show towards the judgment of 
businesspeople -- the “business judgment rule” -- effectively protects many public-minded 
managerial actions from successful legal challenge.  
Are firms in the United States prohibited from sacrificing profits in the public interest?  And 
if so, is the prohibition enforceable?  The answers to these two sub-questions appear to be “maybe” 
and “no”, respectively. U.S. corporate law is consistent with the shareholder primacy model, but as 
long as managers claim some plausible connection to future profitability, the business judgment rule 
grants them leeway to commit corporate resources to projects that benefit the public. 
Simply because the legal system may permit firms to sacrifice profits in the social interest 
does not mean that firms can do so on a sustainable basis in the face of competitive pressures. Under 
many conditions, firms that participate in costly CSR activities will have to raise prices, reduce 
wages and other costs, accept smaller profits, or pay smaller dividends -- and accept the economic 
consequences.  After taking such measures, a firm’s stock price may decline until proportional to 
returns, and attracting new capital may be difficult because returns are below market averages.  
Other short-term economic consequences may include loss of market share, increased insurance 
costs, increased borrowing costs, and loss of reputation.  In the long term, the firm may face 
shareholder litigation, corporate takeover, or closure. 
This process of economic survival of the fittest would suggest that firms that engage in 
unsustainable CSR will find themselves being pushed out of business.  Given the seemingly 
inevitable outcome of this process, why would any firms choose to participate in unsustainable CSR 
activities?  First, the firms that engage (or say they engage) in CSR are often active in markets that 
are imperfect or distorted by government intervention, so that they are buffered from Friedman’s  
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evolutionary imperatives.  Second, principal/agent problems may lead managers to make decisions 
that commit the firm to short-term CSR actions, even if those activities will not be continued in the 
long run.  
Despite a large and growing literature, evidence of firms actually sacrificing profits in the 
social interest is lacking.  The bulk of the available evidence suggests that most firms treat socially 
responsible actions the same way they view more traditional business activities.  Instead of 
altruistically sacrificing profits, they engage in a more limited -- but more profitable -- set of socially 
beneficial activities that contribute to their financial goals. 
Although proponents of sustainable business practices and the “triple bottom line” may argue 
that being environmentally responsible inevitably leads to higher profits in the long term, the 
relationship between socially responsible activities and profitability may be more accurately 
characterized as some firms generate long-term profits from some socially responsible activities 
some of the time. 
Is it in the social interest for firms to carry out CSR activity?  More to the point, should 
governments allow such activity?  Allowing CSR may be preferable to realistic alternatives.  To the 
extent that existing regulations require a level of environmental protection below the socially 
optimal level, additional corporate investment can increase social welfare. In this context, CSR 
should be seen as a complement to increasingly effective government regulation and not as a 
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